August 10, 2026
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“In Respect Of” a Ship Mortgage: Admiralty Jurisdiction and the Limits of Striking Out

In Da Hui Shipping (Pte) Ltd (in creditors’ voluntary liquidation) v Shook Lin & Bok LLP [2026] SGHCR 30, an Assistant Registrar of the General Division of the High Court declined to strike out the greater part of a professional negligence claim, holding it at least arguable that a claim in contribution can be brought “in respect of” a ship mortgage so as to invoke the admiralty jurisdiction. The Assistant Registrar also held that a lost-chance claim turning on unsettled law is generally a matter for trial. Suang Wijaya, Sophia Ng and Lai Zu En acted for the claimant in successfully resisting an application to strike out the whole of the action.

Eugene Thuraisingam Asia LLC acts for the claimant in this professional negligence claim. The claimant’s case is that its former solicitors failed to take the correct procedural steps to invoke the court’s admiralty jurisdiction in rem as against two vessels, causing it to lose the chance of recovering out of the sale proceeds of two vessels.

The defendant, who were the claimant’s former solicitors, attempted to apply to strike out the negligence claim. The striking-out application turned almost entirely on causation.

The striking-out application turned almost entirely on causation. The learned Assistant Registrar noted that the application was of substantial complexity, encompassing issues related to “the scope of the court’s admiralty jurisdiction in rem under the High Court (Admiralty Jurisdiction) Act 1961 (“HCAJA”); non-contractual subrogation to proprietary interests and, in this connection, the recognition of new unjust factors in the law of unjust enrichment; whether the claimant should be permitted to amend its pleadings to introduce a new claim based on the equity of exoneration; and, underlying all of these issues, how a court ought to assess the loss of a chance of a desired litigation outcome which turns on how a hypothetical court – including a hypothetical appellate court – might have decided certain substantive questions if different procedural steps had been taken, in circumstances where the law governing those substantive questions is itself not settled.”

BACKGROUND

The claimant, Da Hui Shipping, owned a vessel mortgaged to a bank to secure a loan facility shared jointly and severally with a related company, An Rong, whose two vessels were mortgaged under the same cross-collateralised arrangement. When the claimant’s vessel was sold, part of its sale proceeds was applied by the bank towards the portion of the debt referable to An Rong’s vessels. That gave the claimant a substantial claim in contribution against An Rong.

The bank and other creditors had arrested and sold An Rong’s vessels. The priority of claims to the sale proceeds of An Rong’s vessels was then determined in admiralty priority proceedings in which the claimant did not participate.

Instead, the claimant, who was then represented by the defendant in the current action, had sought in personam declarations as to its contribution claim and a right to be subrogated to the bank’s security. The General Division of the High Court dismissed those claims on the merits. On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, but on the basis that there was a “fundamental procedural objection” to the claimant’s claim. The Court of Appeal held that if the claimant wished to obtain a distribution out of the sale proceeds of An Rong’s vessels, then the claimant had pursue

an action in rem against An Rong’s vessels. The balance of the sale proceeds was later released to other creditors.

The claimant then commenced the present professional negligence claim against its former solicitors.

THE DECISION

The court allowed the striking out application only in part. The greater part of the claim survives to trial.

On the contribution-based claims, the central question was whether the claimant could have invoked the High Court’s admiralty jurisdiction under s 3(1)(c) of the High Court (Admiralty Jurisdiction) Act 1961 — that is, whether a claim in contribution could be a claim “in respect of” a mortgage of a ship. There was no local authority directly on the meaning of “in respect of” in that provision. Approaching the point afresh, the court held it at least arguable that the words were satisfied: the claim arose directly out of the operation of the cross-collateralised security arrangement, and there was a sufficiently “defined link” between the claim and the mortgages. It was therefore not plain and obvious that the claimant had no real or substantial chance of obtaining a judgment in rem. Those claims were not struck out.

The court also rejected the argument that the claim should be struck out on the basis of stare decisis, or as a collateral attack on earlier decisions amounting to an abuse of process. The relevant question was not what an Assistant Registrar, bound by the earlier decisions, would decide, but what a hypothetical High Court or Court of Appeal (not so bound, and possibly presented with a differently constituted set of facts) might have decided had the earlier proceedings been brought differently.

The subrogation-based claim fared differently. To obtain a proprietary and priority interest by subrogation to the bank’s extinguished security, the claimant needed to establish a recognised unjust factor. The court held it plain and obvious that none was available: the “secondary liability” relied on is not a recognised unjust factor in Singapore law, and the “mere factual inequities” relied on were already answered by the personal remedy of contribution. Applying the careful, incremental approach to new unjust factors, the Assistant Registrar concluded that the prospect of this claim succeeding was speculative rather than real. That head of loss was struck out.

The remaining claims (for wasted costs incurred in the earlier strategy and for the costs of reasonable steps taken in mitigation) were held to raise triable issues and were not struck out.

SOME SALIENT POINTS

First, on admiralty jurisdiction. The decision distinguishes between the type of instrument that engages s 3(1)(c) — a mortgage of or charge on a ship — and the quality of the connection between that instrument and the claim, captured by the words “in respect of.” Those words are wide, and require no more than a “defined link.” For ship-finance disputes arising out of cross-collateralised security structures, the case signals that a claim need not be a claim by the mortgagee, or to enforce the mortgage, to be “in respect of” it. Equally, the court was careful to add that a merely incidental or “but for” connection will not do; the invasive remedy of arrest cannot be extended to claims never contemplated to carry it.

Second, on loss of a chance and unsettled law. In assessing a lost litigation chance, the court will not simply assume that the earlier court’s conclusions would have been repeated. Where earlier and timelier procedural steps might have changed the underlying facts — the sequence and timing of the vessels’ sale, the discharge of the secured debt, or a related company’s liquidation — the counterfactual must be assessed on its own terms. That said, uncertainty in the law is not a

licence to avoid striking out: an insurmountable legal hurdle is not saved merely because an area of law is unsettled.

Third, on the discipline of unjust enrichment. The refusal to allow the subrogation-based claim to proceed underscores that a claimant seeking a proprietary and priority remedy by subrogation to extinguished security must identify a recognised unjust factor. Factual inequity already met by a personal remedy in contribution is not enough, and novel unjust factors face real limits. Practitioners advancing restitutionary claims to leapfrog other creditors should expect that threshold to be applied rigorously, even at the interlocutory stage.

HOW WE CAN HELP

Our firm advises clients on complex, multi-disciplinary commercial disputes, including restitution and unjust enrichment claims, and professional negligence claims against advisers. We act for claimants and defendants at every stage, from strategy and interlocutory applications through to trial and appeal. If you are considering, or facing, a claim of this kind, contact us for a confidential discussion.

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